Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/13/2015 11:51 -0400http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-08-13/project-omega-why-hfts-never-lose-money-criminal-fraud-explainedTwo weeks ago, without knowing the details of
the most recent market-rigging and frontrunning scandal involving
"alternative" market veteran ITG's dark pool POSIT, which issued a vague
8-K it would settle with the SEC for "irregularities", we explained
what we thought had happened:
ITG had an in house prop trading group, or "pilot", which
operated for nearly two years, whose only signal was client order flow,
which it would frontrun, and make millions in profits. In other
words, once again precisely what we have claimed since 2009. But oh
yes, not everyone is guilty of such manipulation. Only Liquidnet... and
Pipeline... and ITG... and countless other ATS and HFT firms for whom
clients are better known as either "easy money" or muppets.
And yes, we get the "trading experiment" narrative: calling it "criminal market manipulation and order frontrunning scheme"
just does not sound like something the Modern Markets Initiative would
spend millions of dollars to get Congressmen to agree on.
It turns out we were spot on, the only thing we missed was the name
of this market manipulation exercise. Now, thanks to the SEC, we know:
"Project Omega" (or as it was also correctly dubbed here the "
criminal frontrunning scheme") is how ITG dubbed its secretive prop-trading desk whose only purpose was to frontrun clients.
Here are the details for all you suckers who still read the HFT
apologists and believe the bullshit that all these algos do is provide
liquidity, when in reality all the really do is frontrun your orders,
assuring them of 6 years of trading without a single day's loss (or in
the case of Virtu,
one trading day loss). From the SEC:
Between approximately April 2010 and July 2011, ITG violated the
federal securities laws and regulations in multiple ways as a result of
its operation of an undisclosed proprietary trading desk known within
ITG as “Project Omega” (“Project Omega” or “Omega”). During the period
of April to December 2010, Project Omega accessed live feeds of ITG
customer and POSIT subscriber order and execution information and traded
algorithmically based on that information in POSIT and in other market
centers. In connection with one of its trading strategies, Project Omega
identified and traded with sell-side subscribers in POSIT and ensured
that those subscribers’ orders were configured in POSIT to trade
“aggressively,” or in a manner that benefitted Omega by enabling it to
earn the full “bid-ask spread” when taking the other side of their
orders.
Project Omega, which operated as part of AlterNet, traded a total of
approximately 1.3 billion shares, including approximately 262 million
shares with subscribers in POSIT. ITG’s proprietary trading gross
revenues resulting from Project Omega totaled approximately $2,081,304.
A quick point here: since ITG was quick to settle at a cost of $20
million, one can be absolutely certain that the true damages to clients,
aka Project Omega revenues, were orders of magnitude higher, however
since it wasn't the SEC's intention to disclose just how criminal HFTs
are in general but just to put a black eye on ITG's dark pool (as
Goldman flexes its muscles and prepares for world algo domination by
taking down its competition one by one), and since it is difficult to
capture all the "externalities" and dollar benefit from rigging, the SEC
was happy to only point out the absolutely bare minimum of damages
which were probably the explicit documented loss by those traders who
brough this case to the SEC's attention in the first place. Everyone
else will have to wait in line for the class action lawsuits to begin
when laying out their damages.
But back to the SEC's big picture "explanation" of what we have said for years:
While Project Omega was engaging in proprietary trading, including
with ITG’s own customers, ITG was simultaneously promoting itself, and
POSIT, as an independent “agency only” broker that did not have
conflicts of interest with its customers and that protected the
confidentiality of its customers’ trade information.
Project Omega was managed and overseen by an ITG senior
executive who at the time served as the firm’s Head of Liquidity
Management (the “Liquidity Executive”). The Liquidity Executive designed
and directed Omega’s trading strategies even though they violated
written policies set by ITG’s compliance department restricting Omega’s
access to customer information.
ITG Inc. and AlterNet violated Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the
Securities Act by engaging in a course of business that operated as a
fraud and by failing to disclose to ITG customers and POSIT subscribers,
among other things, that: (i) ITG was operating a proprietary trading
desk while at the same time promoting its brokerage services and POSIT
by describing ITG as an independent “agency-only” broker; (ii) the
proprietary trading desk, until December 2010, accessed live feeds of
highly confidential order and execution information and used this
information to inform its own trading decisions; and (iii) one of the
proprietary trading desk’s strategies involved identifying sell-side
subscribers with which the desk wanted to trade in POSIT, and ensuring
that those subscribers’ orders were configured to trade “aggressively”
in POSIT.
ITG Inc. violated Rule 301(b)(2) of Regulation ATS by failing to file
an amendment on Form ATS at least 20 days before it launched Project
Omega disclosing the commencement of its proprietary trading activities
and that one of its primary trading strategies would involve accessing
confidential information regarding subscribers’ identities and orders
and trading algorithmically based on a live feed of highly confidential
information regarding open orders bound for the POSIT dark pool.
And here are the details of Project Omega, ör as we
called it in July for what it really was "the criminal market manipulation and order frontrunning scheme":
During the period of late 2009 to early 2010, ITG explored
initiatives to increase diversification and revenues for the firm,
including launching a proprietary trading operation that would engage in
algorithmic high frequency trading. Thereafter, on the
recommendation of senior management, Group’s Board of Directors approved
a proprietary trading desk that was limited in scope to inform whether
ITG should launch a fully-scaled and disclosed proprietary trading
operation. This initiative at ITG, which was managed by the Liquidity Executive, became known as Project Omega.
When he began managing Project Omega, the Liquidity Executive had
overall product management responsibility for all of ITG’s electronic
brokerage products, including its entire suite of trading algorithms,
its smart order routers, and for the POSIT dark pool. Prior to becoming
Head of Liquidity Management in 2009, for several years the Liquidity
Executive had been the Head of Product Management for ITG’s algorithmic
trading group. In that role, he was responsible for designing and
building ITG’s entire suite of trading algorithms and managing a team of
software developers who wrote the computer code for the algorithms.
As a reminder, it
was Zero Hedge who broke,
and subsequently BBG and WSJ confirmed, that the "Liquidity Executive",
aka criminal frontrunning mastermind, was none other than Hitesh
Mittal, the same person who left ITG in 2011 and went on to become the
head trader of the world's 4th largest hedge fund, Cliff Asness'
(formerly of Goldman Sachs) mega quant fund, AQR Capital. It was this
same "liquidity executive" who, after making hundreds of millions in HFT
profits for AQR, was unceremoniously fired early this month. Per the
WSJ:
Hitesh Mittal was terminated from his position as head of trading at
AQR Capital Management LLC in a move related to an enforcement action
the Securities and Exchange Commission brought against a former
employer.
Mr. Mittal was head of trading at the $136 billion hedge fund since
2012. Brian Hurst, AQR’s former head of trading, resumed his role on
July 31, AQR said in a statement. Mr. Mittal wasn’t formally named in
the action, but his role in the project was reported by The Wall Street
Journal and Bloomberg News in recent weeks.
“AQR has ended its employment relationship with Hitesh Mittal,” the
company said in a statement. “Mr. Mittal has been referenced in reports
about an SEC investigation of ITG. This investigation reportedly relates
to misconduct that occurred in 2010 and 2011 while he was employed at
ITG.”
Mr. Mittal didn't respond to attempts to reach him Wednesday.
His boss, Mr. Asness, did not respond to twitter inquiries if the reason he "
loves High-Speed Trading",
as he admitted in a 2014 Bloomberg Op-Ed, is because of the criminal
frontrunning profit it may have afforded him courtesy of the hiring of
the "liquidity executive."
And just so there is no confusion, ITG's "prop trading" group was all HFT and algo-based.
None of the Omega team members had experience with proprietary
trading. Instead, the Omega team consisted almost entirely of ITG
employees with significant experience in ITG’s algorithmic trading group
designing, building and/or writing computer code for ITG’s trading
algorithms. Based on that experience, the Omega team had detailed
knowledge regarding how ITG’s algorithms operated.
Not surprisingly, the whole criminal scheme was shrouded in secrecy:
From the start, and during the entire time it was in operation,
Project Omega’s existence and trading activities were kept confidential
and were not disclosed to ITG customers or POSIT subscribers or to the
Commission.
Proprietary trading represented a significant departure from ITG’s
core “agency-only” business model and public profile, and ITG had
concerns that Project Omega or proprietary trading at ITG could result
in reputational risk for the firm. If ITG decided to increase the scale
of Omega’s proprietary trading activities, ITG planned to disclose its
existence publicly and to customers at that time. However, before
reaching that point, ITG decided that Project Omega and its proprietary
trading activities were to be kept confidential.
Even within ITG, Project Omega was only to be discussed on a
“need-to-know” basis, and even the customer-facing side of ITG was not
informed of Omega’s existence.
The company was smart: it would only rip off sell siders, not the
buyside, because as everyone knows the biggest idiots on Wall Street are
on the sellside; buysiders tend to be at least modestly smarter on
average.
Project Omega was subject to the limitation that its total open positions could not exceed $500,000 at any time. In addition, it was designed to trade only against the orders of sellside subscribers in POSIT, and not against buy-side subscribers.
Based on these limitations, and that ITG initiated Project Omega to
determine whether it could profitably engage in proprietary trading
and/or market making on a larger scale, ITG considered Project Omega to
be an “experiment.”
In short, Project Omega was this:
That's right: dark pools, HFTs, and so on, are nothing more than the Office Space scam
: steal a little, millions of times, just don't get caught.
However, just like in Office Space, they eventually got caught.
And here's why:
For the period of approximately April to December 2010, Omega’s
Facilitation Strategy, which was designed by the Liquidity Executive,
involved trading based on a live feed of information (the “Aleri Feed”)
relating to open orders routed by sell-side subscribers to ITG’s trading
algorithms for handling. 8 The Omega team accessed the feed by
connecting to a software utility called “Aleri” that was used by ITG’s
sales and support teams. The feed contained various categories of
real-time information regarding “parent” orders routed through virtually
all of ITG’s algorithms, including: (a) client identifier, (b) symbol,
(c) side, (d) quantity of shares, (e) filled shares, (d) target price,
(e) the ITG algorithm in which the order was located, and (f) time
parameters.
The Facilitation Strategy was designed to detect open orders of
sell-side subscribers being handled by ITG via the Aleri Feed and, based
on that information, open positions in displayed markets on the same
side as the detected orders, and close its positions in POSIT by taking
the other side of the detected orders. The Facilitation Strategy was designed to earn the full “bid-ask spread” by opening and then closing positions.
* * *
For the entire time that ITG’s proprietary trading desk was in
operation, the Omega team had access to the identities of POSIT
subscribers and used this information to identify the full range of
potential sell-side subscribers for Omega to trade with in POSIT. In
addition, the Omega team used the information to which it had access to
analyze the Facilitation Strategy’s profits and losses by contra party. Based
on these ongoing profit and loss analyses, and without POSIT
subscribers’ knowledge or consent, the Omega team made decisions about
whether to stop trading with a small number of subscribers and to
continue trading with others.
The Facilitation Strategy was designed to trade only with the
sell-side subscribers identified by Omega. In order to effectuate this
aspect of the strategy, the Omega team needed assistance from the POSIT
development team – a group that also reported up to the Liquidity
Executive. At the direction of the Omega team, ITG’s POSIT team
implemented the required configurations in the dark pool to “enable”
sell-side subscribers to trade, or interact, with Omega in POSIT.
* * *
Despite the strategy’s goal of earning the full “bid-ask
spread,” there were times when Omega executed trades in POSIT at
“midpoint” and did not obtain the “full spread.” In certain
instances when this happened, the Liquidity Executive directed his team
to investigate by coordinating with the POSIT development team to
determine why the trades executed at midpoint, instead of at the bid or
the offer, as the Liquidity Executive thought they should have.
No market participant other than Project Omega had access to the information provided in the Heatmap Feed.
From approximately April to December 2010, Omega’s Heatmap Feed
included live trade execution information for all of ITG’s customers,
including both sell-side and buy-side customers.
In December 2010, ITG’s Senior Management and Compliance
Department Learned that Project Omega was Improperly Accessing
Subscriber Order Information.
In the late fall of 2010, ITG’s CEO directed two other ITG executives
to speak with the Liquidity Executive to gather information concerning
the operation of Project Omega for the CEO’s information and to assist
the CEO in making a presentation to Group’s Board of Directors in
February 2011.
In early to mid-December 2010, ITG’s compliance department and senior
management learned – based on the Liquidity Executive’s admissions –
that Project Omega was trading based on a live feed of information
regarding sell-side customers’ orders that had been sent to ITG’s
algorithms. As a result, ITG immediately suspended Project
Omega’s trading. Shortly thereafter, the compliance department and ITG’s
senior management learned additional detail regarding the Facilitation
Strategy and Omega’s use of the Aleri Feed, as well as certain
information about Project Omega’s use of the customer execution feed in
connection with its Heatmap Strategy.
The Liquidity Executive had not previously disclosed to ITG’s
compliance department or senior management that Project Omega’s
strategies involved accessing and trading based on the Aleri Feed and
the Heatmap Feed. Instead, prior to December 2010, the Liquidity
Executive had misrepresented to ITG’s compliance department the manner
in which Project Omega’s trading strategies were operating.
On approximately December 20, 2010, a meeting among ITG’s senior
management and compliance department was held to address Project Omega. During
this meeting, the CEO reprimanded the Liquidity Executive for violating
ITG policy and placing the firm at risk. Thereafter, Project Omega made
certain changes to its trading strategies and was permitted to restart
live trading.
As a reminder, this same liquidity executive went on shortly
thereafter to become head of trading at Cliff Asness' AQR hedge fund.
But wait, despite being "reprimanded" Hitseh Mittal continued to defraud clients:
On or around December 21, 2010, Project Omega restarted a modified
Facilitation Strategy that did not involve access to the Aleri Feed. In
addition, Project Omega restarted a modified Heatmap Strategy on or
around January 24, 2011, without direct access to the Heatmap Feed.
When Project Omega resumed trading, no changes were made to its
organizational structure. As before the temporary suspension, the
Liquidity Executive continued to manage Project Omega and direct its
trading strategies while also continuing his overall product management
responsibilities for ITG’s trading algorithms, smart order routers and
POSIT, which included access to confidential customer order and trade
information. The other members of the team also continued in the same
roles they had before the temporary suspension.
Despite the removal of the improper direct feeds, in connection with
the Facilitation Strategy, Project Omega continued to have improper
access to information identifying POSIT subscribers. In addition, the
Omega team continued to coordinate with ITG’s POSIT development team to
identify the sell-side subscribers for Omega to trade with in POSIT and
to ensure that such subscribers were configured to trade “aggressively”
in POSIT.
After resuming trading in late 2010, Project Omega continued to
engage in live trading until on or around July 11, 2011, when ITG
terminated the Liquidity Executive as an employee and discontinued
Project Omega’s operations.
During and after the temporary suspension of Project Omega’s trading
activities in December 2010, ITG continued to keep Project Omega and its
trading activities confidential and made no disclosure of it publicly,
to subscribers, or to the Commission via an amendment to the POSIT Form
ATS.
That's ironic: at the time Traders Magazine reported that Mittal had
been fired in what was a "cost-cutting measure." That was incorrect. He
was caught rigging markets. At this point he wasted no time to move to
AQR where he was welcomed with open arms, and make his boss Cliff Asness
millions in profits which in turn gave Cliff the green light to write
pandering op-eds
about why he loves HFT.
* * *
The fraud was so blatant not even the staunchest supporters of the HFT lobby could
come up with anything even remotely relevant to justify this fraud:
... one thing to say about this is: Hahahaha, that's really bad! Like, paranoid-fantasy bad.
The deep worry of modern equity market structure is that high-frequency
traders, brokers, exchanges and dark pools are conspiring in some
combination to front-run unsuspecting customers: The bad guys know,
somehow, that the customers are trying to buy a particular stock, and
can, somehow, race ahead of those customers to buy the stock and re-sell
it to them at a higher price. And that's exactly what happened here!
So, terrible. ITG will pay the SEC $20.3 million, a record dark-pool
fine. "'The conduct here was egregious,' Andrew Ceresney, director of
the SEC’s enforcement division, said during a conference call
Wednesday," and it is hard to argue with that.
The "analysis" could have just ended there, and spared itself the footnoted embarrassment.
* * *
But none of the above is really shocking: after all the only business
model of HFT is criminal order frontrunning, pure and simple, which is
why it allows multi-millionaires to become billionaires even as they
profess their love of said crime, under the guise of "high-speed
trading."
What is shocking is the following, from the filing:
... on the recommendation of senior management, Group’s Board of Directors approved a proprietary trading desk that was limited in scope to inform whether ITG should launch a fully-scaled and disclosed proprietary trading operation. This initiative at ITG, which was managed by the Liquidity Executive, became known as Project Omega.
So the company's board was ultimately responsible for Project Omega, a board among whose
members was the following :
Mr. O’Hara worked in the Division of Enforcement of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission and as Special Assistant United
States Attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice

As we reported before,
O'Hara promptly quit the
day ITG announced the SEC settlement - after all it wouldn't look very
good to have a former SEC enforcer oversee a market rigginal, and
criminal client defrauding prop trading group which was busted by, well,
the SEC... but by then it was too little, too late.
And there you have it: open, outright, market rigging and criminal fraud, and best of all,
with the explicit blessing of former SEC enforcers. As in, the fox is not only not guarding the hen house, but telling the hens to come right in: the water is warm.
And that's why the US equity market is a farce, broken beyond repair
and will never be fixed until everything comes crashing down to be
rebult from scratch.
Source: SEC Charges ITG With Operating Secret Trading Desk and Misusing Dark Pool Subscriber Trading Information