Shayna Steinger was a participant or observer in the following events:
Shayna Steinger, a consular official who issues the
future 9/11 hijackers with 12 US visas, arrives at the US consulate in
Jeddah to start her first Foreign Service assignment. (Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003) Steinger will issue visas to future 9/11 hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi (see September 3, 2000), Saeed Alghamdi (see September 4, 2000), Hani Hanjour (see September 10, 2000 and September 25, 2000), Wail and Waleed Alshehri (see October 24, 2000), Ahmed Alnami (see October 28, 2000), Ahmed Alhaznawi (see November 12, 2000), Alnami again (see April 23, 2001), Saeed Alghamdi again (see June 12, 2001), Abdulaziz Alomari (see June 18, 2001), Khalid Almihdhar (see June 13, 2001), and Salem Alhazmi (see June 20, 2001). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2)
The 9/11 Commission will not refer to Steinger in its main report, but
will say that a single official issued multiple visas to the hijackers
in Jeddah in its Terrorist Travel monograph. The Commission gives the
number of visas issued as 11. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 33
 ) However, a list found in the Commission’s records will give 12 visas as being issued by Steinger. (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2)
That list appears to be accurate as there is no information indicating
one of these 12 visas was issued by another consular officer. The
Commission makes another apparent error with the hijackers’ visas,
claiming that Salem Alhazmi did not receive a US visa in April 1999,
when other sources indicate he did (see April 3-7, 1999).
Two
consular officers at the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Shayna
Steinger and David El Hinn, argue over the eligibility of Saudi citizens
for US visas. The consulate had instituted a policy of aggressively
interviewing young Saudi males in the wake of the 1998 East African
embassy bombings due to terrorism concerns (see (Late August-September 1998)).
When El Hinn arrives in Jeddah in August 2000, the consulate is still
interviewing a significant percentage of Saudi visa applicants and all
first-time students. El Hinn will say that officers are suspicious of
Saudi citizens who are from locations where they know extremists live
and who have only a vague notion of where they are headed in the United
States. In addition, officers at the consulate think that, because of
trouble in the Saudi economy, Saudis perhaps should not be getting visas
almost automatically. Therefore, El Hinn denies a significant
percentage of Saudi visa applicants as well as third-country applicants.
Steinger, who works full-time on visas and deals with most of the Saudi
applicants, takes a different approach and issues visas to almost all
the Saudis who apply for one. Despite the obvious terrorism concerns
that had previously been known to US officials in Jeddah, Steinger will
say that she is “never really afraid of Saudis” and never makes the
connection between the known presence of al-Qaeda members in Saudi
Arabia and the possibility that the Saudis applying for visas are
terrorists. Steinger believes that El Hinn is denying Saudis visas for
what she will call “the wrong reasons,” and the two clash over this. El
Hinn is even rebuked by the consul general in Riyadh for his high
refusal rate. Nevertheless, El Hinn does not change his practices.
Steinger issues 12 visas to the future 9/11 hijackers (see July 1, 2000). (Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/23/2003; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 125-126
)
Future
9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alghamdi obtains a visa from the US consulate in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, using a passport that is only 13 days old. It
appears he is not interviewed. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 13
) The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
Future 9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi obtains a visa from the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 24
) The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003) However, Alghamdi will later get another visa using a different passport, also from Steinger (see June 12, 2001).
The 9/11 Commission will say that one or possibly both of his passports
may have fraudulent features, presumably related to travel stamps,
although it is not certain of this. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 525, 564; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 24 )  Hani
Hanjour’s September 10 US visa application, which was rejected. The
fact he requested permission to stay in the US for three years is
highlighted on the right. [Source: National Review] (click image to enlarge)Future
9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour applies for a US tourist/business visa at
the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Hanjour, who has already spent
a good deal of time in the US (see October 3, 1991-February 1992, Spring 1996, October 1996-December 1997, and 1998),
uses a passport issued on July 24, 2000. His application is incomplete,
as he says he is a student, but fails to give his school’s name and
address. After his application is screened, he is referred to a consular
officer for an interview. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 13, 174-5 ) This consular officer is Shayna Steinger, who issues a total of 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers (see July 1, 2000). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
Hanjour’s application is denied as he says he wants to stay in the US
for three years, raising concerns he might become an immigrant. Hanjour
also says he wants to attend flight school in the US, changing his
status to “student” from “tourist” after arrival. However, this is
another reason Steinger denies the visa application, “because he has
been in the States long enough to decide what he wanted.” Hanjour will
return to the consulate two weeks later and successfully obtain a visa
from Steinger using a different application (see September 25, 2000). (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 13, 174-5 ) Steinger will later give a series of conflicting explanations about why she reversed her decision and issued the visa (see August 1, 2002, January 20, 2003, and December 30, 2003).
After 9/11, a former consular official named Michael Springmann will
say that while serving in Jeddah during the Soviet-Afghan War he was
sometimes pressured to reverse denials of visa applications by the CIA
for apparent mujaheddin (see September 1987-March 1989).
Future
9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour again applies for a US visa at the US
consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. An application two weeks earlier had
been rejected (see September 10, 2000), but he is successful this time. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 13-14
) The application is dealt with by consular officer Shayna Steinger, who issues a total of 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers (see July 1, 2000) and who rejected Hanjour’s previous application. (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
Hanjour apparently applies for a student visa, not a tourist visa, as
he had done previously, saying he wishes to attend a language school in
California. Steinger will later recall that Hanjour, or someone acting
on his behalf, submits an I-20 INS school enrollment form, the
documentation required for the visa. She will say: “It came to me, you
know, at the end of the day to look at it. I saw he had an I-20 and it
[his visa] was issued.” This apparently allows Hanjour to overcome his
previous rejection, as the two applications are treated as one case. The
INS had approved a change of status for Hanjour to attend the same
school in 1996, but Steinger does not know of this. She will later say
that, if she had known, she might have denied the visa. Although a
photocopy of a student visa in Hanjour’s passport will later be made
public, Steinger now enters the visa in the State Department’s records
as a business/tourist visa. (Note: the visa in Hanjour’s passport may be
changed upon his entry to the US (see December 8, 2000).) (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 13-14, 38)
Steinger will later give conflicting accounts of her issuance of this
visa. She will first falsely claim to the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform that she issued the visa under the Visa Express
program and that Hanjour was not even present during the first
application on September 10 (see August 1, 2002), but will later change her story for the State Department’s inspector general (see January 20, 2003) and the 9/11 Commission (see December 30, 2003).
After 9/11, a former consular official named Michael Springmann will
say that while serving in Jeddah during the Soviet-Afghan War he was
sometimes pressured to reverse denials of visa applications by the CIA
for apparent mujaheddin (see September 1987-March 1989).
Using new passports obtained three weeks previously (see October 3, 2000), future 9/11 hijackers Waleed and Wail Alshehri obtain tourist visas to the US. (US Department of State 10/24/2000; US Department of State 10/24/2000)
The visas are issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official at the US
consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, who apparently issues the 9/11
hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
The Alshehris make several errors in the applications, which should
normally lead to them being rejected. They only give their
employer’s/school’s address as “South city” and the address they will be
staying at as “Wasantwn,” although they do not specify whether this is
the city or the state. They also say they will stay for four to six
months, although it is unclear how they will support themselves during
this time, and on Wail’s application form Steinger does not even bother
to complete the section on checking the applicant has the necessary
funds. In addition, the Alshehris say they will arrive in the US “after
two weeks”—presumably meaning two weeks after the visa’s application was
filed. However, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Waleed will
arrive on April 23, 2001 and Wail will arrive on June 8, 2001 (see April 23-June 29, 2001). They appear to receive their visas on the same day they apply for them. (US Department of State 10/24/2000; US Department of State 10/24/2000; Mowbray 10/9/2002)
The 9/11 Commission will say that their passports may have fraudulent
features, presumably related to travel stamps, although this is not
certain. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4)
Future
9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami and candidate hijacker Mushabib al-Hamlan
obtain US visas from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 14-15
) Alnami’s visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000) and will issue Alnami with a second visa next year (see April 23, 2001). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
Alnami’s application is incomplete, as he lists his occupation as
“student,” but does not provide a complete address for his school. He
also gives his US address as “in Los Angeles” and writes that “my friend
Moshibab” will be traveling with him. The 9/11 Commission will later
suggest that Alnami’s passport may contain fraudulent travel stamps
associated with al-Qaeda, although this is not certain and is apparently
not noticed at this time. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 14-15 )
The 9/11 Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alnami’s
passports may contain a suspicious indicator of Islamist extremism, but
this is not certain (see November 6, 1999 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 14-15 )
Before obtaining the visa, Alnami and al-Hamlan followed instructions
given them by al-Qaeda leaders Mohammed Atef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,
and contacted future 9/11 hijacker Waleed Alshehri in Jeddah. They
briefly share an apartment with Alshehri, who provides them with
directions to the consulate and shows them how to fill out visa
applications. Al-Hamlan will soon drop out of the plot after contacting
his family. Alnami will later be said to fly to Beirut with the
Alshehris (see Mid-November, 2000). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 526)
Future 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alhaznawi obtains a US visa from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 15
) The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
Alhaznawi may present a passport with fraudulent travel stamps and does
not fully complete his application form, leaving blank the address of
his school. He is not interviewed. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 15, 36, 180-1 )
The 9/11 Commission will also suggest that Alhaznawi’s passport may
contain a suspicious indicator of Islamist extremism, but this is not
certain (see Before November 12, 2000 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 14-15 )
After acquiring a new Saudi passport (see April 21, 2001),
future 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami obtains a new US visa at the US
consulate in Jeddah, even though he already has a valid US visa in his
old passport (see October 28, 2000). (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 21
) The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000) and had issued Alnami’s previous visa. (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
A handwritten note on Alnami’s application indicates that he is
interviewed briefly, either by Steinger or another staff member. Previous Visa - Alnami marks the “no” box in response to a question asking if he has ever applied for a US visa previously, but changes his answer to “yes,” possibly due to the brief interaction with Steinger or another consular official. However, he fails to specify when he applied for the visa. Had he done so, it would have been clear that he was applying for another visa long before his previous visa had expired, which would have raised questions. The information about his previous visa is available at the consulate, but is not accessed, as consular workers do not usually examine previous visa issuances, only refusals. Not Interviewed - The 9/11 Commission will later say that Saudis were rarely interviewed at this time. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 21, 184-5 )
However, according to a consular officer serving in Jeddah at the time,
while most Saudis may not have been interviewed, “the majority” of
males traveling alone aged between 16 and 40 are interviewed and
officers are “not shy” of turning them down on security grounds. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 36 ) Suspicious Indicator in Passport - The 9/11 Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alnami’s passports may contain a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism, but this is not certain (see April 21, 2001 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 14-15 )  Saeed Algahdmi, in a video apparently made in December 2000. [Source: As-Sahab]Future
9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi obtains a US visa from the US consulate in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The application is made through the Visa Express
program (see May 2001), using a passport issued two days earlier. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 24 ) The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003) Lies on Application - Alghamdi lies on his application form, claiming that he has never before applied for a US visa, when in fact he obtained one the previous year, also from Steinger (see September 4, 2000). Fellow hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Ahmed Alnami make similar false statements on their visa applications around this time (see April 23, 2001 and June 13, 2001), although Alnami corrects his application. The information about his previous visa is available at the consulate, but is not accessed, as consular workers do not usually examine previous visa issunces, only refusals. The 9/11 Commission will speculate that he lied on purpose to conceal the previous application. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 24 ) Fraudulent Features - The Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alghamdi’s passports may contain fraudulent features, but will claim that this is not certain, as Alghamdi’s passport was not recovered after 9/11. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 42 )
This is an error by the Commission, as Alghamdi’s passport will
actually be found after 9/11 and the Commission will be aware of this
(see Shortly After September 11, 2001). KSM's Travel Agent - The travel agency used for the Visa Express application is Minhal Travel, which will also later be used by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to obtain a US visa (see July 23, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 24, 29 )
Future 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar obtains a second US visa from the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 24-25
) The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the future 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003) Almihdhar’s passport, which was issued two weeks previously (see June 1, 2001),
lacks an expiry date, but contains an indicator of possible terrorist
affiliation used by the Saudi authorities to track suspected radicals
(see November 2, 2007).
His application form is incomplete, as it lists his occupation as
“businessman,” but does not give his employer’s name and address. Lies on Application Form - The form, which is submitted through the Visa Express program (see May 2001), meaning Almihdhar is not interviewed, contains two lies: Almihdhar says he has never received an American visa or traveled to the US, whereas he received a visa in 1999 (see April 3-7, 1999) and traveled to the US on it in 2000 (see January 15, 2000). As Almihdhar’s first visa was also issued by the Jeddah consulate, through which the CIA sent radical Arabs to the US for training during the Soviet-Afghan war (see September 1987-March 1989), consular officials could discover he is lying, but information about prior visas issuances is not automatically displayed to them. Known Terrorist - By this time, several intelligence agencies are aware that Almihdhar is an al-Qaeda operative; for example, the CIA (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000), NSA (see December 29, 1999), FBI (see January 5-6, 2000), a US Army intelligence program (see January-February 2000), the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (see 1997), Malaysian Special Branch (see January 5-8, 2000), and an intelligence service in the United Arab Emirates (see January 2-5, 2000)). Parallels to Case of Blind Sheikh - Almihdhar will re-enter the US on the visa three weeks later (see July 4, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will find that the series of missteps preceding the issuance of visas to Almihdhar and the other future 9/11 hijackers has some “eerie parallels” to the “series of exceptional failures” that led to US visas being issued to the “Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see December 15, 1986-1989 and July 1990). (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 24-27, 33, 49 )
Future 9/11 hijacker Abdulaziz Alomari obtains a US visa from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 525) The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
Alomari’s application is incomplete, as he lists his home address as
the Alqudos Hotel in Jeddah. He is not interviewed and the application
is submitted by Attar Travel as a part of the Visa Express program (see May 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 25
)
Further, Alomari leaves blank the fields for his sex, his wife’s name,
and his school’s address, although he says he is a student. He claims to
be a tourist, that he wants to stay two months from June 25, and that
he will first stay at the JKK Whyndam Hotel. (US Department of State 6/18/2001)
The 9/11 Commission will say Alomari’s passport contains fraudulent
travel stamps whose use will subsequently be associated with al-Qaeda. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 25 )
Future
9/11 hijacker Salem Alhazmi obtains a US visa from the American
consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There are some problems with his visa
application, which is submitted through the Visa Express program (see May 2001):
 The application is incomplete; Alhazmi gives his occupation as “unemployed” (this does not concern consular staff because Saudi Arabia is a rich country); His passport is only four days old;
The passport contains a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism
placed their by Saudi intelligence in order to track him (see June 16, 2001 and November 2, 2007). Some of the radicals who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 also had Saudi passports with the same indicator (see Around February 1993); (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 25-6 )
Some of the other future hijackers who apply for visas around this time
lie on their applications, claiming never to have received a US visa
before, although the opposite is true (see April 23, 2001, June 12, 2001, and June 13, 2001).
The 9/11 Commission will not discuss whether Alhazmi claims on this
application to have received a US visa before or not, as the Commission
will appear to be unaware of any such previous application by him.
However, according to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Alhazmi did
previously obtain a US visa, in 1999 (see April 3-7, 1999); (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004 ) The NSA has been intercepting calls between Alhazmi and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen for at least two years (see Early 1999, Shortly Before December 29, 1999, and Summer 2000); The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the future 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). (9/11 Commission 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers (see July 1, 2000),
gives incorrect testimony about one of the visa issuances to the House
Committee on Government Reform. The incorrect testimony concerns the
issue of a visa to Hani Hanjour, the alleged pilot of Flight 77, which
hit the Pentagon. Steinger initially refused to grant Hanjour a visa
(see September 10, 2000), but then reversed her decision two weeks later (see September 25, 2000).
Steinger claims that she initially denied Hanjour a visa because he
applied under the Visa Express program. However, the visa was denied in
September 2000 and the Visa Express program did not begin until May 2001
(see May 2001).
Steinger claims to have a memory of the event which cannot be correct.
“I remember that I had refused him for interview, because he had applied
for a tourist visa and he said that his reason for going to the United
States was to study,” she tells the committee. The denial was “for
administrative reasons,” she adds. It meant: “No. Come in. I want to
talk to you.” The 9/11 Commission will point out that this cannot have
been the case, stating, “In fact, the date Hanjour applied (as shown on
his written application) and the date he was denied (as shown both on
the application and on [the State Department’s] electronic records) are
the same: September 10, 2000.” (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 37-38
) This is apparently the first time Steinger has been interviewed by anyone about the 12 visa issuances. (Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
Steinger will be interviewed twice more about the visas, changing her
story about Hanjour. One interview is by the State Department’s
inspector general (see January 20, 2003), the other by the 9/11 Commission (see December 30, 2003).
Shayna Steinger, a consular official who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers at the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (see July 1, 2000),
is interviewed by the State Department’s inspector general. The
interview is part of a probe into the issuance of visas to the 9/11
hijackers and the questions asked are the standard ones put to all
consular officers that issued visas to the hijackers. Steinger says:
This is only her second interview about what happened, the first being Congressional testimony in August 2002 (see August 1, 2002). She expresses surprise at this. It did not matter that all the hijackers’ visa applications were incomplete, because Saudis were eligible for visas anyway.
She did not interview most of the hijackers she issued visas to and,
even if she had interviewed them, she would probably have issued them
with visas. She did interview Hani Hanjour (see September 10, 2000 and September 25, 2000),
and says he seemed “middle class” and not “well-connected.” In this
context she adds that Saudis were not asked to provide documents to
support their applications. It is unclear why she says this as she said
in her Congressional testimony that Hanjour did have to provide
documentation and had in fact provided it.
She criticizes David El-Hinn, the other consular officer issuing visas
in Jeddah at the same time, for his high refusal rate (see Early Fall 2000).
After 9/11 Steinger wrote a cable saying that nothing had changed at
the consulate in Jeddah, and she was criticized for this after the cable
was leaked to the press. (Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State) 1/30/2003)
Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers in Jeddah (see July 1, 2000),
serves as the political officer at the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.
The start and end dates of her tour of duty are unknown, but she meets
with Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri on July 8. (Rafic Hariri 7/8/2003)
Shayna Steinger, a consular official who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers at the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (see July 1, 2000),
is interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, represented by staffers Thomas
Eldridge and Joanne Accolla. Regarding the issue of a visa to alleged
Flight 77 pilot Hani Hanjour, where Steinger initially refused the visa
and then granted it (see September 10, 2000 and September 25, 2000), Steinger says Hanjour was “typical of many Saudi students” in that he switched between schools in the US. (9/11 Commission 12/30/2003)
The Commission is aware that Steinger made incorrect statements about
the issue of the visa to Hanjour to a Congressional committee (see August 1, 2002),
but apparently it does not ask her about this, although these
statements will be mentioned in its Terrorist Travel Monograph. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 13-14, 37-38
)
Steinger also says she remembers “press accounts of the ‘chatter’
surrounding a possible impending attack” before 9/11, but thought it was
more likely to be carried out by Egyptians or Yemenis. Before 9/11 she
was “never aware of the level of disaffected extremism in Saudi
society,” she says. She knew Saudis were al-Qaeda members, but,
according to a memo of the interview drafted by the Commission, “she
never made the connection between this fact, and the idea that the
Saudis applying for visas were possible terrorists.” Despite the fact
that Steinger was unaware Saudis could be terrorists, on some occasions
she sent Security Advisory Opinion cables warning about a visa
application in connection with terrorism. (9/11 Commission 12/30/2003)
Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers in Jeddah (see July 1, 2000),
is nominated for a new State Department rank. According to the
Congressional Record, Steinger and several other officials are proposed
for the rank of “foreign services officers of class four, consular
officer and secretary in the Diplomatic Service of the United States of
America.” (US Congress. Senate. 4/8/2004)
Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers in Jeddah (see July 1, 2000), serves as the chief of the political and economic section at the US Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen. (US Department of State 9/2004)
Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers in Jeddah (see July 1, 2000),
receives a posting at the State Department in Washington. She takes up
the position of a desk officer at the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’s
Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs, where she is responsible for
the West Bank and Gaza. (Association 1/2008
)
Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers in Jeddah (see July 1, 2000), becomes a board member of the American Foreign Service Association. (Association 1/2008
)
According to its Web site, the association has 15,000 dues-paying
members who work abroad, mostly for the State Department, and its
principal mission is to protect their interests and enhance the
effectiveness of the US’s Foreign Service. (American Foreign Service Association 4/17/2010) Steinger is currently a desk officer at the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs (see Before January 2008).
Also appointed to the board at this time are former Ambassador Barbara
Bodine, who hampered the FBI’s investigation into the USS Cole bombing in 2000 (see October 14-Late November, 2000), and Anne Aguilera, a consular officer who has served in Iraq. (Association 1/2008 )
Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who issued 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers in Jeddah (see July 1, 2000),
serves as the political officer at the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, United
Arab Emirates. The date of her appointment is not known, but she is
listed as the political officer there in a State Department telephone
directory published in early December. (US Department of State 12/2/2009)
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Monday, August 10, 2015
Shayna Steinger - July 1, 2000: Consular Official Who Issues 9/11 Hijackers with 12 Visas Arrives in Jeddah
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