The Fascinating Story Of How The Petrodollar Was Born And Lived In Secrecy For Over 40 Years

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/31/2016 10:02 -0400
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-05-31/secret-story-how-saudi-petrodollar-deal-was-born
For decades, the story of Saudi Arabia recycling petrodollars, i.e., funding the US deficit by buying US Treasuries with proceeds of its crude oil sales (mostly to the US), while the US sweetened the deal by providing the Saudis with military equipment and supplies, remained entirely in the conspiracy realm, with no confirmation or official statement from the US Treasury department.
Now, that particular "theory" becomes the latest fact, thanks to a fascinating story by Bloomberg which gives the background and details of secret meeting between then-US Treasury secretary William Simon and his deputy, Gerry Parsky, and members of the Saudi ruling elite, and lays out the history of how the petrodollar was born.
Here is the background:

It was July 1974. A steady predawn drizzle had given way to overcast skies when William Simon, newly appointed U.S. Treasury secretary, and his deputy, Gerry Parsky, stepped onto an 8 a.m. flight from Andrews Air Force Base. On board, the mood was tense. That year, the oil crisis had hit home. An embargo by OPEC’s Arab nations—payback for U.S. military aid to the Israelis during the Yom Kippur War—quadrupled oil prices. Inflation soared, the stock market crashed, and the U.S. economy was in a tailspin.

Officially, Simon’s two-week trip was billed as a tour of economic diplomacy across Europe and the Middle East, full of the customary meet-and-greets and evening banquets. But the real mission, kept in strict confidence within President Richard Nixon’s inner circle, would take place during a four-day layover in the coastal city of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

The goal: neutralize crude oil as an economic weapon and find a way to persuade a hostile kingdom to finance America’s widening deficit with its newfound petrodollar wealth. And according to Parsky, Nixon made clear there was simply no coming back empty-handed. Failure would not only jeopardize America’s financial health but could also give the Soviet Union an opening to make further inroads into the Arab world.

It “wasn’t a question of whether it could be done or it couldn’t be done,” said Parsky, 73, one of the few officials with Simon during the Saudi talks

As noted above, the framework of the required deal was simple: the U.S. would buy oil from Saudi Arabia and provide the kingdom military aid and equipment. In return, the Saudis would plow billions of their petrodollar revenue back into Treasuries and finance America’s spending.
The man leading the US negotiation, US Treasury Secretary William Simon, had just done a stint as Nixon’s energy czar, and "seemed ill-suited for such delicate diplomacy. Before being tapped by Nixon, the chain-smoking New Jersey native ran the vaunted Treasuries desk at Salomon Brothers. To career bureaucrats, the brash Wall Street bond trader—who once compared himself to Genghis Khan—had a temper and an outsize ego that was painfully out of step in Washington. Just a week before setting foot in Saudi Arabia, Simon publicly lambasted the Shah of Iran, a close regional ally at the time, calling him a “nut.”

But Simon, better than anyone else, understood the appeal of U.S. government debt and how to sell the Saudis on the idea that America was the safest place to park their petrodollars. With that knowledge, the administration hatched an unprecedented do-or-die plan that would come to influence just about every aspect of U.S.-Saudi relations over the next four decades (Simon died in 2000 at the age of 72).

In the beginning it wasn't easy: "it took several discreet follow-up meetings to iron out all the details, Parsky said."
But at the end of months of negotiations, Bloomberg writes, there remained one small, yet crucial, catch: King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud demanded the country’s Treasury purchases stay “strictly secret,” according to a diplomatic cable obtained by Bloomberg from the National Archives database."
The secret remains... until May 16 when the US Treasury for the first time ever revealed the full extent of Saudi TSY holdings.


Bloomberg adds that with a handful of Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, the secret was kept for more than four decades—until now. "In response to a Freedom-of-Information-Act request submitted by Bloomberg News, the Treasury broke out Saudi Arabia’s holdings for the first time this month after “concluding that it was consistent with transparency and the law to disclose the data,” according to spokeswoman Whitney Smith. The $117 billion trove makes the kingdom one of America’s largest foreign creditors."
The TIC data released later that day confirmed the FOIA response.
To be sure, as we commented in mid-May, it is very likely that the Treasury report is incomplete, and that the Saudis also own hundreds of billions in Treasurys held in custody with offshore trading centers such as Euroclear. After all, the current tally represents just 20 percent of its $587 billion of foreign reserves, well below the two-thirds that central banks typically keep in dollar assets
What’s more, the commitment to the decades-old policy of “interdependence” between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, which arose from Simon’s debt deal and ultimately bound together two nations that share few common values, is showing signs of fraying. America has taken tentative steps toward a rapprochement with Iran, highlighted by President Barack Obama’s landmark nuclear deal last year. The U.S. shale boom has also made America far less reliant on Saudi oil.
Needless to say, the real total notional amount of Saudi holdings will eventually become known, especially if the middle-eastern nation follows through with its threat of liquidating some or all of them.  What is more notable, however, is that with the first disclosure of this data since the birth of the petrodollar, something appears to have changed:

What’s more, the commitment to the decades-old policy of “interdependence” between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, which arose from Simon’s debt deal and ultimately bound together two nations that share few common values, is showing signs of fraying. America has taken tentative steps toward a rapprochement with Iran, highlighted by President Barack Obama’s landmark nuclear deal last year. The U.S. shale boom has also made America far less reliant on Saudi oil.

“Buying bonds and all that was a strategy to recycle petrodollars back into the U.S.,” said David Ottaway, a Middle East fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington. But politically, “it’s always been an ambiguous, constrained relationship.”

One thing that certainly changed is that in a world where central banks are ravenously buying up each others' (and their own) debt, the need for Petrodollar recyclers such as Saudi Arabia is no longer there. But that was not always the case:

[B]ack in 1974, forging that relationship (and the secrecy that it required) was a no-brainer, according to Parsky, who is now chairman of Aurora Capital Group, a private equity firm in Los Angeles. Many of America’s allies, including the U.K. and Japan, were also deeply dependent on Saudi oil and quietly vying to get the kingdom to reinvest money back into their own economies.

"Everyone—in the U.S., France, Britain, Japan—was trying to get their fingers in the Saudis’ pockets,” said Gordon S. Brown, an economic officer with the State Department at the U.S. embassy in Riyadh from 1976 to 1978. For the Saudis, politics played a big role in their insistence that all Treasury investments remain anonymous.

America's reliance on Saudi Arabia to fund its deficit - and obtain a cheap price for oil - meant that the kingdom would be granted Platinum status in every form of interaction with the US.

Tensions still flared 10 months after the Yom Kippur War, and throughout the Arab world, there was plenty of animosity toward the U.S. for its support of Israel. According to diplomatic cables, King Faisal’s biggest fear was the perception Saudi oil money would, “directly or indirectly,” end up in the hands of its biggest enemy in the form of additional U.S. assistance.

Treasury officials solved the dilemma by letting the Saudis in through the back door. In the first of many special arrangements, the U.S. allowed Saudi Arabia to bypass the normal competitive bidding process for buying Treasuries by creating “add-ons.” Those sales, which were excluded from the official auction totals, hid all traces of Saudi Arabia’s presence in the U.S. government debt market.

“When I arrived at the embassy, I was told by people there that this is Treasury’s business,” Brown said. “It was all handled very privately.”

* * *
Another exception was carved out for Saudi Arabia when the Treasury started releasing monthly country-by-country breakdowns of U.S. debt ownership. Instead of disclosing Saudi Arabia’s holdings, the Treasury grouped them with 14 other nations, such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria, under the generic heading “oil exporters”—a practice that continued for 41 years.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continued buying: by 1977, Saudi Arabia had accumulated about 20 percent of all Treasuries held abroad, according to The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets by Columbia University’s David Spiro.

The deal led to assorted headaches: "an internal memo, dated October 1976, detailed how the U.S. inadvertently raised far more than the $800 million it intended to borrow at auction. At the time, two unidentified central banks used add-ons to buy an additional $400 million of Treasuries each. In the end, one bank was awarded its portion a day late to keep the U.S. from exceeding the limit.

Most of these maneuvers and hiccups were swept under the rug, and top Treasury officials went to great lengths to preserve the status quo and protect their Middle East allies as scrutiny of America’s biggest creditors increased.

Over the years, the Treasury repeatedly turned to the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act of 1976—which shields individuals in countries where Treasuries are narrowly held—as its first line of defense.

The strategy continued even after the Government Accountability Office, in a 1979 investigation, found “no statistical or legal basis” for the blackout. The GAO didn’t have power to force the Treasury to turn over the data, but it concluded the U.S. “made special commitments of financial confidentiality to Saudi Arabia” and possibly other OPEC nations.

Simon, who had by then returned to Wall Street, acknowledged in congressional testimony that “regional reporting was the only way in which Saudi Arabia would agree” to invest using the add-on system.

Ultimately, Saudi dominance in the US Treasury market meant they were untouchable. "It was clear the Treasury people weren’t going to cooperate at all,” said Stephen McSpadden, a former counsel to the congressional subcommittee that pressed for the GAO inquiries. “I’d been at the subcommittee for 17 years, and I’d never seen anything like that."
Today, Parsky says the secret arrangement with the Saudis should have been dismantled years ago and was surprised the Treasury kept it in place for so long. But even so, he has no regrets. Doing the deal “was a positive for America”, he says cited by Bloomberg.
And with that the story of how the Petrodollar was born is now public information, something which Saudi Arabia may not be too happy with. For the sake of the US, it better have its ducks in order because the release of this story simply means that the US Treasury is confident it will no longer have a strategic need for its long-time Saudi partner. The Fed, which has implicitly stepped into the Saudi role, better not disappoint.

The Real Reason Saudi Arabia Killed Doha

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/25/2016 13:35 -0400
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-04-25/real-reason-saudi-arabia-killed-doha
Submitted by Rakesh Upadhyay via OilPrice.com,
Saudi Arabia single-handedly scuttled the Doha meeting, knowing all along that Iran would not participate, with a valid reason. The Russians and others agreed to proceed without Iran, planning to include them at a later date. So if everything was known beforehand, why did the Saudi’s pour cold water on the aspirations of the remaining members, risking its alienation from Russia and the OPEC community?
Was it simply Saudi enmity toward Iran? Not exactly. Upon closer scrutiny, we can find the Saudi masterstroke behind Doha.
It is well known that Saudi Arabia is heavily dependent on oil revenues, and that those revenues are on the brink of collapse. They have sought financial aid from various international agencies to support their dwindling economy. But the trick here is to determine exactly how desperate the Saudis are. Certainly not as desperate as other countries.
Angola has recently sought support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Venezuela’s struggles started well before crude prices dropped to 12-year lows and is fighting to avoid a disaster. Azerbaijan has also approached the IMF and the World Bank for help.
Nigeria is also seeking the World Bank’s support. Without external support, Iraq will find it difficult to continue its war against the Islamic State (ISIS). Lower oil prices continue to make matters worse, and Iraqi Kurdistan has taken advantage of the situation and works towards independence and beefing up its unilateral export plans. Ecuador is the worst hit, and now the devastating earthquake has crippled the nation. It will need help from the IMF, the World Bank and a few other lenders to reconstruct.
After a 3.5 percent contraction in 2015, Russia’s gross domestic product will take a further 1.5 percent hit in 2016, as projected by the Central Bank. Kazakhstan is faring no better. Its growth shrunk to 1.2 percent in 2015 from an impressive 6 percent in 2013 and is expected to slow down further to 0.1 percent in 2016.
Most of the participating nations are financially ruined. They have to undertake drastic measures to reduce their dependence on oil. Disaster is imminent.
The Saudis are definitely not immune, even if on the surface disaster isn’t obvious. Saudi Arabia is burning through its reserves at a record pace, but at the same time, it can sustain low prices for the next three to four years. Not only that, it can increase its production by another 2 million barrels per day, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), if more funds are required.
But why the drastic action on the eve of the meeting disregarding the plight of the participating member nations?
Though the real reason for the about face is known only in the secretive halls of the royal palace, consider this:
Saudi Arabia has held the mantle as the world leader in oil for decades, and has largely enjoyed veto power on all things concerning oil. However, since 2014, it has waged a losing battle against the U.S. shale oil drillers, who are phenomenally more resilient than anyone expected.
The first signs of the shale producer vulnerability are now, however, becoming visible, with oil production in the U.S. dropping below 9 million barrels a day—the lowest in 18 months. If oil prices continue to remain below $40 per barrel, a few more shale oil producers will fall by the wayside.
But if crude prices rise above $50 per barrel, the shale producers have made their intentions clear, that they will be back in business.
If Saudi Arabia had accepted the deal, oil prices would have jumped to $50/b, giving the shale oil industry a new lease on life. Shale producers would have started pumping at a frantic pace, increasing the glut and pushing oil prices back down.
This whole exercise would permanently dent Saudi Arabia’s reputation as the leading oil player. The baton would have passed to the shale oil drillers—an event that the Saudis simply cannot allow.
With Iran’s return post-sanctions, Saudi Arabia’s leadership in OPEC is under threat. By scuttling the meeting, Saudi Arabia has asserted its supremacy and reminded the OPEC nations just how much power the Saudis still wield.
The Saudis have ascertained their importance in the new cartel as well. They have not let Russia assume sole leadership, they have ensured that they remain at the centre of any decision making in the new cartel.
By voicing their objection to the meeting, Saudi Arabia has attempted to win back the leadership baton from American shale producers. It has shown the OPEC members that it still is the leader, thereby blocking Iran from challenging it, and finally, it has maintained its importance in the new bigger cartel, demanding an equal say in the scheme of things alongside Russia.
The Doha washout was the Saudi masterstroke to regain its importance. However, with many OPEC nations on the edge of collapse, the next OPEC meeting will confirm if the Saudi move was indeed a masterstroke, or if it was just a short-lived power grab.

"I'll Go Full Power If There's No Agreement" - Kuwait Breaks OPEC Production Freeze

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 03/08/2016 08:03 -0500
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-03-08/ill-go-full-power-if-theres-no-agreement-kuwait-breaks-opec-production-freeze

Back in late February, when crude prices had just hit a 13 year low, one catalyst unleashed a furious short-covering rally: a WSJ report which cited a delayed SkyNews interview with the UAE energy minister, according to which OPEC would freeze, if not cut production. Since then we learned, courtesy of the Saudi oil minister Al-Naimi himself, that the Saudis will never reduce output, however, in a utterly meaningless gesture, Saudi Arabia and Russia agreed to "freeze" production at levels which are already at maximum capacity and under one condition: that all other OPEC members join the freeze, with the possible exception of Iran which may be allowed to produce until it hits its pre-embargo export levels.

Of course, even said "freeze" is nothing but a stalling tactic employed by an OPEC member (Saudi Arabia), to give the impression that OPEC still exists as a production-throttling cartel when OPEC ceased to exist in that capacity in November 2014. Everything since then has been one surreal redux of "Weekend at Bernies" where everyone pretends not to notice the corpse in the room.

However, while many had pretended to at least play along with the charade, today a core OPEC member effectively broke ranks when Kuwait said it would only agree to an output freeze if all major producers take part including Iran.

According to Reuters, Kuwait's oil minister said on Tuesday that his country's participation in an output freeze would require all major oil producers, including Iran, to be on board.

"I'll go full power if there's no agreement. Every barrel I produce I'll sell," Anas al-Saleh told reporters in Kuwait City. And since Iran has made it very, very clear it will not join the production freeze at its current mothballed output, and will need at least 9-12 months before it regains its pre-embargo capacity levels, one can forget about a production freeze well into 2017 if not for ever since by then at least one if not more OPEC members will be bankrupt (they know who they are: they are the source of those "ALL CAPS" flashing read headlines every day).

Putting Kuwait's production in context, Kuwait - the small Gulf state Saddam invaded 25 years ago - is currently producing 3 million barrels of oil per day. Incidentally, this is precisely how much the oil market is oversupplied each and every day, and why in addition to PADD1, 2 and 3 being almost full, and excess oil now being stored in ships, pipelines and trains, and re-exported to Europe, quite soon empty swimming pools will be full with the "black gold" as the algos continue to refuse to pay any attention to the constantly deteriorating fundamentals.

Kuwait's announcement followed a report by Goldman overnight in which, as we reported, Jeff Currie said that "commodity rally is not sustainable" and it is time to sell crude.

"While these dynamics (rising prices) could run further, they simply are not sustainable in the current environment," the analysts wrote. "Energy needs lower prices to maintain financial stress to finish the rebalancing process; otherwise, an oil price rally will prove self-defeating, as it did last spring."

Perhaps, but not just yet: in addition to China's abysmal exports we also learned that in February China's crude imports soared 19.1% to 31.80 million tonnes, or about 8 million barrels per day, an all time high, suggesting China - like the US - is filling every available container including its SPR at a time when precise are relatively low even if organic demand continues to deteriorate.

As Reuters writes, "despite strong oil demand, questions about the sustainability of growing consumption weighed on markets after China's overall exports tumbled by a quarter in February."

China's February vehicle sales, a key driver for gasoline demand, were down 3.7 percent year on year, data from the country's Passenger Car Association showed."This is really a poor start for trade this year," said Zhang Yongjun, senior economist at the China Centre for International Economic Exchanges.

However, judging by the latest bounce in crude in the last hour of trading, the only thing that still matters is who does the daily "short squeeze" rip higher. By the looks of things, at least one major trader already got the tap on the shoulder.

How OPEC Just Crushed Oil With One Chart

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 11/12/2015 08:20 -0500
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-11-12/how-opec-just-crushed-oil-one-chart
Just when you thought it couldn't get any worse - amid supply gluts, production surges, market share scrambles, and demand disappointment - it does. OPEC this morning confirmed not only no change in the already weak global demand picture but the current oil inventrory surplus is the largest in at least a decade. This has driven WTI prices down close to a $41 handle this morning (from over $48 a week ago) as simply put, there's too much oil and OPEC's grand strategy for solving this imbalance - pray for a colder winter...
Crude is down 7 of the last 9 days...


As Bloomberg reports, OPEC's new statement does not bode well for the short- or medium-term future...

Surplus oil inventories at highest level in at least a decade on increased global production, OPEC says in Monthly Oil Market report.

Stockpiles in developed economies 210m bbl higher than their 5-yr avg

Compares w/ 180m bbl overhang in 1Q 2009, which is only other occasion in past 10 yrs when inventory surplus has surpassed 150m bbl

Excess supply may be pared in coming mos on slowing non-OPEC supply, rising demand for winter fuels

...

Non-OPEC supply to contract next yr for 1st time since 2007; down 130k b/d to 57.11m b/d

OPEC keeps 2015, 2016 fcasts for global oil demand unch.

And so here, in one simple chart, is why this will not end well... There's too much oil!!
Supply and demand growth so far in 2015...



And OPEC's strategy to 'solve' this? Pray for a colder winter!!

The recent decline in oil prices has encouraged additional oil demand. It has also provided a challenging market environment for some higher-cost crude oil production, which has already shown a slowdown. Moreover, strategic oil reserves have grown as some countries – including China and India – have taken advantage of lower prices to add to their reserves, a trend that is likely to continue.

In addition, a colder- or longer-than-expected winter, as well as better-than-projected economic activities, could support incremental demand. This would help alleviate the current overhang and support a recovery of crude oil prices in the coming months.

Charts: Bloomberg